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INTRODUCTION
Imagine your most recent visit to one of America’s breathtaking
national parks. While enjoying the stunning landscape and the smell
of fresh air, you notice something in the distance. Bolted and
chained to a set of large boulders stands what looks like an
abandoned wooden billboard in the middle of a pristine landscape.
Intrigued, you climb a small rock outcropping to get a better look at
this square six-foot-tall plank of wood. After arriving, you notice the
remnants of a small wooden sign that reads: “Erected in Memory of
1
the Dead of All Wars.”
Confused? If your answer is yes, many visitors to the Mojave
National Preserve would most likely agree. The billboard-like
2
structure on the Preserve is actually a Latin cross erected in 1934.
In 2007, after the Ninth Circuit determined that the symbol
constituted government endorsement of religion and was therefore
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, the cross was
3
covered with a plywood box pending resolution of the case.
A constitutional controversy regarding a cross on public land is not
uncharted territory in the Ninth Circuit or other courts across the
4
country. Indeed, the land that religious symbols occupy has proved
1. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono,
129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (describing past signs posted on the Mojave cross);
see also Steve Brown, Faith Under Fire in the Desert, THE SUN RUNNER, Dec. 2006–
Jan. 2007, available at http://www.thesunrunner.com/Stories/Faith_Under_Fire_in_
the_Desert/faith_under_fire_in_the_desert.html (recounting the history of the
memorial that the cross intends to commemorate).
2. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2009).
For pictures of the cross in its current condition and in its unaltered state prior to
the court’s involvement, see The Mojave Cross Christian Church Website,
http://mojavecrosschristianchurch.com/cgi-bin/photoalbum/view_album/160040
(last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
3. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769.
4. See, e.g., Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617,
619 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a fifty-one-foot high Latin cross in a city park
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to be a common constitutional battleground in courts across the
5
country. The present dispute turns on whether the sale of a parcel
of land occupied by a cross constitutes a valid remedy for an
6
Establishment Clause violation. Two circuit courts of appeals have
7
taken differing analytical approaches, and the Supreme Court is
8
prepared to hear arguments.
This Comment argues that courts should not adopt a presumption
of validity in favor of the government when determining whether
land transfers have remedied a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The risks of continuing government action through manipulation of
property designations necessitate more searching judicial review than
the limited presumption test currently provides.
Part I of this Comment explores the development of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in the context of the display of religious
symbols while tracking the Court’s manipulation of property
designations as proposed remedies in other constitutional contexts.
constituted government endorsement of Christianity regardless of the builders’
intent to honor war veterans); Carpenter v. City of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627,
630–32 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the city’s ownership of a large cross in public
park violated the “no preference” clause of the California Constitution due to the
symbol’s prominent location and significant religious meaning); Am. Jewish
Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379, 384–85 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a city’s
arbitrary policy that permitted the construction of a twenty-seven-foot menorah on
public property but denied an application to erect a Latin cross on the same
property).
5. See generally Kong v. City of San Francisco, 18 F. App’x 616 (9th Cir. 2001)
(challenging the auction of a parcel of public land containing a religious symbol);
Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (disputing displays of Latin
crosses on the city and county seal as well as in public parks); Southside Fair Hous.
Comm. v. City of New York, 928 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1991) (calling into question the
city’s sale of land to a Hasidic congregation); Trunk v. City of San Diego,
568 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (resisting the government’s taking of a
memorial site by eminent domain and the placement of a cross on the property for
operation by a civic organization); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d
567 (D. Md. 2005) (contesting the sale to a private organization of a parcel of a city
park on which a Ten Commandments monument sits); Murphy v. Bilbray,
No. 90-134 GT, 1997 WL 754604 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1997) (confronting, under the
Establishment Clause, a private organization’s purchase of a fifteen-square-foot
parcel containing a thirty-five-foot cross).
6. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 768.
7. Compare Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007), amended
and reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v.
Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009), with Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000).
8. See Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009). Aside from its relevance to the
particular issue of land transfers, commentators such as Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky view the case as potentially having a broader impact on Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. See David G. Savage, Desert Cross May Lead to Landmark
Church-State Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at A8 (commenting that the Supreme
Court’s current makeup could result in the restriction of Establishment Clause
violations to the government’s literal establishment of a church or coercion of
religious participation).
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Part I also examines the history of the Mojave cross and presents the
conflicting analytical frameworks of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
Part II argues that the present framework is too lenient when it
comes to permitting land transfers and that failure to apply more
searching scrutiny ignores the potential for continued government
violations of the Establishment Clause. Part II also reasons that, when
viewed in light of the Supreme Court’s response to defective
desegregation plans and the use of a state official’s illegally obtained
evidence in federal proceedings, the proposed land transfer remedy
is merely the latest example of the government’s preservation of an
unconstitutional result through seemingly lawful property-based
means.
Finally, Part III proposes an abandonment of the presumption
standard and a return to the Court’s original (but oft-criticized)
9
Establishment Clause test outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Consistent
with the Court’s reasoning in the desegregation and Fourth
Amendment contexts, this test would work in two important ways.
First, it would require that the proposed transaction have a secular
purpose. Second, it would assure that the change in ownership does
not yield a potentially unconstitutional effect in advancing or
endorsing religion. In addition, analysis through the Lemon lens
would rightfully shift the focus of a court’s analysis back to the true
question at hand: whether an Establishment Clause violation persists
in substance regardless of a change in form. Unlike the Seventh
Circuit’s presumption, an analysis in line with the First Amendment
itself would help streamline an unpredictable line of cases while also
addressing the danger of government actors circumventing a court
injunction.
I.

BACKGROUND

The use of land transfers to remedy Establishment Clause
violations evades rather than honors the First Amendment’s
requirement that the government abstain from the endorsement or
10
establishment of religion.
Remedies for violations of the
Establishment Clause must be properly and uniquely tailored to fully
11
Two artifacts of Supreme Court history,
correct the infraction.
9. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 629 (1988) (noting a court’s broad
scope in remedying constitutional violations); see also Susan Gellman & Susan
Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases
(Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 732–33 (2008)
(arguing that the appropriate remedy in an equal protection approach to litigating
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faulty desegregation plans after the second installment of Brown v.
Board of Education and the emergence of the “silver platter doctrine”
in contravention of protections against unreasonable searches and
12
seizures, illustrate the Court’s refusal to permit the ongoing
manipulation of constitutional rights.
A. Religious Displays Under the Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
13
religion.” Whether it is in the interest of preserving religion from
contamination by the state or guarding the state from governmentsponsored indoctrination, our nation’s history evidences a
14
long-standing interest in the separation of church and state.
While the necessity of this tradition is universally recognized, the
means of evaluating such separation has undergone extensive
15
inquiry. The multitude of tests set forth in modern Supreme Court
doctrine represents what one court has described as a kind of
16
“jurisprudential schizophrenia.”

Establishment Clause controversies will not always be inclusion of additional religious
symbols, but will depend on the circumstances of each individual case).
12. See infra note 57.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. Compare LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 249 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1994) (1986) (claiming the need for
separation between the “garden of the church and the wilderness of the world” so
that “His garden and paradise” may be restored (quoting Roger Williams,
Mr. Cotton’s Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered (1644) reprinted in
1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392 (Perry Miller ed., Russell &
Russell, Inc. 1963))), with Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist
Association (Jan. 1, 1802) (on file with the Thomas Jefferson Papers at the Library of
Congress), available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/danburys.jpg (stating
that “religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God” that requires
“building a wall of separation between church and State”). In its first modern
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court echoed this
separationist language when it enumerated the activities prohibited under the First
Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (commenting
that “[t]he ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither can a state nor the Federal Government . . . pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . . No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. . . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between
Church and State.’” (internal citation omitted)).
15. See LEVY, supra note 14, at 206 (recognizing that litigation over publicly
sponsored religious symbols has produced conflicting interpretations of the
Establishment Clause by forming sharp divisions on the Court).
16. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 717
(9th Cir. 1999). One commentator argues that each test the Supreme Court
“concoct[s]” is as misguided as the previous one because they have all failed to
address the true historical reality behind the enactment of the Establishment Clause.
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The Court’s initial test for evaluating the constitutionality of
17
religious displays was set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Under this
three-part test, displays passed constitutional scrutiny as long as they
(1) had a secular purpose, (2) did not have the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) did not promote any
18
“excessive government entanglement with religion.”
This test
symbolized a dramatic shift from the Court’s prior perspectives of the
19
role of religion in American society. Perhaps for this reason, the
Lemon test has faced scrutiny for its nearly categorical rejection of
20
religion and its inconsistency in application.
Out of this sometimes contradictory doctrine sprang new
21
experimentation in evaluating public religious displays. In Lynch v.
22
Donnelly, the Court charted a different course by electing to adopt a
23
more permissive test for interpreting the Establishment Clause.
As part of an influential concurrence, Justice O’Connor employed an
“endorsement test” in finding that the display of a crèche did not
24
constitute an establishment of religion. She reasoned that allegedly
religious displays only violate the Establishment Clause when a
reasonable person would understand that the symbol evokes
25
government endorsement of religion. Like Lemon, the endorsement
test has also faced significant—though very different—scrutiny from
26
27
within the Court and from various commentators.
BARRY ADAMSON, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE SUPREME
COURT: HOW THE COURT FLUNKED HISTORY 241 (2008).
17. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See generally Stephen M. Feldman, Critical Questions in
Law and Religion: An Introduction, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 2
(Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
18. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
19. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (claiming that the
citizens of the United States “are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being”).
20. See PATRICK M. GARRY, WRESTLING WITH GOD: THE COURTS’ TORTUOUS
TREATMENT OF RELIGION 56 (2006) (detailing the Court’s erratic application of Lemon
to approve a state’s provision of hearing devices to parochial school students while
striking down the state’s administration of remedial instruction to the same group).
21. See id. at 57 (highlighting two of the Court’s experimental approaches,
the coercion test and the neutrality approach).
22. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
23. See id. at 674 (describing the “unbroken history” of religion as part of
American life beginning in 1789); see also GARRY, supra note 20, at 68 (praising Lynch
for its recognition that the Lemon analysis was hostile towards religion); LEVY, supra
note 14, at 206 (asserting that Lynch “lowered the wall of separation between church
and state” by permitting the display of a religious symbol in a public space).
24. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing the endorsement test as
unworkable and flawed due to its disregard for religion’s historical significance in
the American tradition); see also id. at 593–94 (concluding that the principle of
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Nonetheless, the endorsement test has remained the predominant
standard for the evaluation of violations under the Establishment
28
Clause until—in typical contradictory fashion—the Court decided
29
30
Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU.
In McCreary
County, a majority of the Court employed the Lemon test to invalidate
31
two displays of the Ten Commandments on courthouse property.
After the ACLU’s initial challenge, the Kentucky counties made
efforts on two separate occasions to secularize their display through
the inclusion of other documents and messages rather than remove it
32
as directed under the already-issued preliminary injunction.
The Court reasoned that the original displays, as well as the attempts
33
to make them more secular, did not demonstrate a secular purpose.
However, the Van Orden plurality upheld the display of the Ten
Commandments on the Texas State Capitol on the grounds of the
34
monument’s “historical role.” The display on government land was
situated among numerous other monuments and statues
35
commemorating “Texan identity.”
Ignoring Lemon, the Court
embraced the structure as a “passive monument,” acknowledging the
36
strong role religion has played throughout the country’s history.
These rulings complicate the question of when (and whether) to
apply Lemon, but also introduce yet another factor to consider when
faced with similar controversies: the history and tradition of
37
governmental acknowledgement of religion.

“endorsement” set forth in Lynch is a mere continuation of the privileges against
religious “favoritism” and “promotion” that the Lemon test aims to counteract)
(majority opinion).
27. See GARRY, supra note 20, at 68 (critiquing the endorsement test’s
disproportionate focus on emotional responses to religious symbols rather than
constitutional doctrine).
28. Id. at 57.
29. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
30. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
31. Id. at 868–89.
32. See id. at 852–57 (recounting the Kentucky Legislature’s authorization of
displays of the Ten Commandments as long as they included the posting of the
Magna Carta, the lyrics to the Star-Spangled Banner, and other documents that
made up “The Foundations of American Law and Government Display”).
33. See id. at 871–72 (refusing to accept the claim that a reasonable citizen would
look at the more secular collection of symbols independently of the original, overtly
religious display).
34. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690.
35. See id. at 681 (quoting H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001)).
36. Id. at 677–78.
37. Compare McCreary Country, 545 U.S. at 861–62 (reinforcing a court’s need to
look at the “purpose” inquiry of Lemon in the Establishment Clause context),
with Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686–87 (questioning the greater significance of the Lemon
test and instead opting to analyze the Establishment Clause issue in light of the
monument’s history and tradition).

136

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:129

B. Unconstitutional Responses to Desegregation and the
Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule
Confusion as to the continued viability of constitutional doctrine is
38
certainly not unique to Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The enforcement of school desegregation plans and the introduction
of illegally obtained evidence in federal court are analogous to the
proposed land transfer remedy due to the federal government’s
unique use of physical property to manipulate another party not
39
bound by the same limits to achieve unconstitutional aims.
Perhaps more importantly, these two pieces of Supreme Court history
illustrate the Court’s tradition of recognizing and remedying
seemingly inconsistent outcomes and government manipulation.
1.

Faulty desegregation plans and the evasion of “deliberate speed”
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
40
protection of the laws.” As stated in the landmark case of Brown v.
41
Board of Education (Brown I), segregated public school systems are
42
“inherently unequal” and violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) ordered that the
desegregation of these unconstitutional binary school systems be
43
effectuated “with all deliberate speed” and under the direction of
local district courts in the interest of making each district’s transition
44
as site-specific as possible. Unfortunately, by adopting measures that
failed to firmly implement the ruling of Brown I in public school
systems, Brown II permitted unconstitutional segregated school
45
systems to persist.
38. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing the use of
statements at trial for impeachment purposes even though they had been obtained
in violation of Miranda).
39. See infra Part II.B.2 (comparing the federal government’s control over
property through its use of state officials by way of the exclusionary rule, local school
officials in the desegregation context, and private individuals through the land
transfer remedy in response to an Establishment Clause violation).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. Id. at 493–95 (reasoning that the important benefit of education in modern
society, as well as the adverse effects segregation inflicted on African-American
youths, mandated the provision of an integrated school system).
43. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
44. Id. at 299 (“Because of [the district courts’] proximity to local conditions and
the possible need for further hearings, the [district] courts which originally heard
these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal.”).
45. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 85 (2007) (“The Court approved gradualism, imposed no deadlines for
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Desegregation plans across the country produced only token
integration and almost completely diluted the “deliberate speed”
46
47
However, in Griffin v. County School Board the Court
standard.
responded, concluding that “[t]here has been entirely too much
deliberation and not enough speed” in instituting unitary school
48
systems. Desegregation plans were not meant to be lazy endeavors,
49
but rather “quick and effective” relief.
The facts in Griffin epitomize the continuing segregation that
Brown I attempted to eradicate but permitted through its adoption of
50
the “deliberate speed” standard prior to 1964. Officials in Prince
Edward County, Virginia refused to levy school taxes for the
1959–1960 school year based on their opposition to a unitary school
51
system, leaving the county’s schools closed from 1959 until 1963.
While the public schools were closed, the county provided tuition
grants and other subsidies to those students attending private, white
52
schools. In holding that the complete closure of public schools in
Prince Edward County denied African-American children equal
protection of the law, the Court focused on the net effect of the
53
school’s response to Brown I. The Court refused to permit a transfer
of public schooling responsibilities to private hands when the
54
resulting social implications so blatantly contradicted Brown I.
Griffin signaled the beginning of a period in which the Court
refused to tolerate manipulation of the public-private distinction to
beginning or completing desegregation, issued vague guidelines, and entrusted
(southern) district judges with broad discretion.”).
46. See, e.g., Kelley v. Bd. of Educ., 270 F.2d 209, 213–15 (6th Cir. 1959)
(describing a school plan that allowed students to transfer from a school where their
racial group was in the minority, thereby ensuring segregation of schools).
47. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
48. Id. at 229.
49. Id. at 232.
50. See Charles Ogletree, All Too Deliberate, in THE UNFINISHED AGENDA OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION 45, 49–50 (James Anderson & Dara N. Byrne eds., 2004)
(recounting that a mere two years after Brown I, a large southern delegation that
included representatives from Alabama, Virginia, and Georgia formed a “Southern
Manifesto” to subvert the decision and keep schools segregated through state and
local enactments as well as unofficial funding).
51. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 222–23. One commentator remarked that, “[b]y 1964,
Prince Edward County had become a national and international embarrassment,
as 1,700 black youngsters went largely uneducated for several years.” KLARMAN,
supra note 45, at 102.
52. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 221.
53. See id. at 231 (“[T]he record in the present case could not be clearer that
Prince Edward’s public schools were closed . . . to ensure . . . that white and colored
children in Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to the
same school.”).
54. See id. (“Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State’s allowing a
county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and
grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”).
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55

justify untimely desegregation.
Although Brown II’s porous
“deliberate speed” standard allowed school districts to evade Brown I’s
desegregation requirement, the Supreme Court recognized and
56
attempted to counter this doctrinal deficiency.
2.

Fourth Amendment protections and the “silver platter doctrine”
Like the responses of some school districts to Brown I, the
57
“silver platter doctrine” presented the Court with attempted stealth
encroachments to constitutional rights. The Fourth Amendment
58
protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
59
In Weeks v. United States, the Court articulated its landmark
exclusionary rule, which prohibited the use of evidence obtained in
violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in federal
60
proceedings. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule was
necessary in order to prevent the complete devaluation of vital
61
Fourth Amendment rights.
While Weeks did much to limit Fourth Amendment abuses, the
Court placed firm limitations on the reach of this new evidentiary
rule by definitively announcing that suppression applied only to
62
evidence unlawfully obtained by federal officials. The Weeks court
55. See, e.g., United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484,
490–91 (1972) (holding that the school board’s fear that white students will leave
public school for private and suburban schools does not justify postponement of
compliance with school desegregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1971) (finding that a seemingly neutral plan assigning a
student to the school nearest to her home is not acceptable because its overall effect
may not achieve racial integration); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 396 U.S. 1215, 1217
(1969) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)) (denying the school district’s
claim that developing public support was necessary before implementing
desegregation plan).
56. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1973) (finding that a state
program that lent textbooks to private segregated schools was unconstitutional
because the state may not provide financial aid to institutions practicing racial
discrimination).
57. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949) (coining the phrase
“silver platter” to refer to the interplay between state and federal agents in the use of
illegally obtained evidence). Specifically, the “silver platter doctrine” permitted
otherwise-excludable evidence to be served up on a silver platter to prosecutors in
federal proceedings in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
60. See id. at 391–93 (implying that the Fourth Amendment protects against the
federal government’s abuse of power).
61. See id. at 393 (affirming that while efforts to bring criminals to justice should
be lauded, they should not be accomplished “by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land”).
62. See id. at 398 (concluding that the Court could not prescribe a remedy in
relation to the local policeman’s misconduct because the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to non-federal officials).
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reasoned that state and local officials were not subject to the same
constraints because the Fourth Amendment was designed to
63
encompass only the federal government and its agencies.
Therefore, when federal agents were not involved in the unlawful
64
acquisition of evidence, the exclusionary rule would not apply.
After Weeks, the Court began the process of eroding this bright-line
65
exception. In Byars v. United States, the Court excluded evidence
where an officer’s search “in substance and effect was a joint
66
operation of the local and federal officers.” Another 1927 decision,
67
Gambino v. United States, focused on the nexus between the federal
68
purpose and the state officers’ search. The Court had come so far
as to say that, even when state agents had not acted specifically under
the direction of—or in cooperation with—their federal counterparts,
the use of illegally obtained evidence was unlawful when the seizure
69
occurred “solely on behalf of the United States.”
Regardless of the holdings in Byars and Gambino, the central tenets
70
71
of Weeks held firm.
It was not until Wolf v. Colorado, that a
unanimous Court found, by incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment, that “[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police . . . [is] implicit in ‘the concept of ordered
liberty’ and . . . enforceable against the States through the Due
72
Process Clause.”
Though lower courts disagreed over the significance of this
73
finding, the Court would later put the final nail in the silver platter

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
66. Id. at 33.
67. 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
68. See id. at 315 (“[The] facts . . . make it clear that the state troopers believed
that they were required by law to aid in enforcing the National Prohibition Act,
and that they made this arrest, search, and seizure, in the performance of that
supposed duty, solely for the purpose of aiding in the federal prosecution.”).
69. Id. at 312, 314–15.
70. Until 1949, illegally obtained evidence was excluded from federal
proceedings when federal officers procured it or took a somewhat active role in
obtaining it alongside state officers. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 212–13
(1960). Courts did not exclude such evidence when state officials provided it of their
own accord for federal prosecutions. Id.
71. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
72. Id. at 27–28.
73. Compare Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723, 726–28 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(concluding that Wolf’s proscription of evidence obtained through unconstitutional
searches and seizures by state officials under the Fourth Amendment nullified the
distinction set forth in Weeks between federal and state agents), with Burford v.
United States, 214 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1954) (refusing to suppress evidence in
federal court obtained through an unauthorized search and seizure by state officials
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74

doctrine’s coffin in Elkins v. United States. Relying on the Court’s
75
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment in Wolf, the Court
ultimately held that personal property obtained by any officer—state
or federal—was inadmissible in federal court if the defendant’s right
76
against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated.
Notably, the Court acknowledged the state’s interest in promoting
77
collaboration of all levels of law enforcement, but refused to
acknowledge the silver platter doctrine as a valid exercise of that
78
interest. By masking the identity of those seizing personal property,
officials of all levels were not working under the Constitution, but in
79
spite of it.
C. The Mojave Cross: From the Desert to the Courtroom
1.

The installation and maintenance of the Mojave cross
The Mojave National Preserve is a primarily federally-owned tract
80
The park was
of desert land spanning some 1.6 million acres.
originally under the control of the Bureau of Land Management,
but in 1994 the Bureau transferred ownership and the responsibility
81
of maintaining the Preserve to the National Park Service.
On top of a stone outcropping called Sunrise Rock, along Cima
Road in the Mojave National Preserve, stands the most recent
82
installment of the five-foot-tall cross. A prospector named J. Riley
Bembry and a group of World War I veterans were the first to fasten
because, under Gambino, there was no collaboration or participation with federal
officials).
74. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
75. See id. at 213 (stating that Wolf’s inclusion of state searches under the
Constitution directly contradicted the rationale that once justified the admission of
state-seized evidence in federal court).
76. Id. at 223. The Court’s decision was largely based on federalism grounds.
See id. at 221 (reasoning that, in states that have adopted the exclusionary rule, the
admission of unlawfully obtained evidence in federal court from the work of state
officials frustrates the state’s ability to set policy and honor its obligations under the
Federal Constitution).
77. Id. at 221.
78. See id. at 221–22 (refusing to endorse cooperation that gives rise to the
erosion of constitutional rights).
79. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961) (citing Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)) (postulating that requiring federal and state officials to
observe the same constitutional standards in the prosecution of a crime will increase
rather than hinder their effectiveness).
80. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and reh’g
denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono,
129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).
81. Richard Lake, That Old Rugged Cross, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 15, 2002, at 1B,
available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Dec-15-Sun-2002/news/
20274896.html.
82. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2009).
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83

the cross atop Sunrise Rock in 1934. Since then, the structure has
84
been modified and replaced several times. Bembry and his fellow
veterans originally erected the cross to memorialize the sacrifice of
85
fallen soldiers.
They also placed wooden signs near the cross
86
expressing this purpose. Over time, however, community members
87
began using the cross as a site for sunrise services on Easter Sunday.
2.

The involvement of Congress and the courts
Prior to May 1999, the cross at Sunrise Rock garnered little
attention from either the National Park Service or the Bureau of
88
Land Management. However, the spark that ignited the ensuing
legal firestorm involved a request to build another religious symbol—
89
a Buddhist stupa—near the cross. In denying this request, the Park
Service acknowledged the existence of the Mojave cross and
90
expressed its intention to remove it. Perhaps also feeling pressure
91
from the ACLU, the Park Service initiated a study of the cross’s
history to determine whether it could be designated in the National
92
Register for Historic Places. The study concluded that, regardless of
its commemorative value, the cross’s previous religious use precluded
93
it from being classified as a historical site.
94
Largely under the direction of Representative Jerry Lewis,
Congress responded by passing two separate appropriations bills in

83. Lake, supra note 81, at 1B.
84. Id.
85. Alliance Defense Fund, ADF to 9th Circuit: Mojave Land Transfer Was Legal,
Uncover That Cross, Apr. 9, 2007, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/
story.aspx?cid=4067.
86. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769.
87. Lake, supra note 81, at 1B.
88. Brown, supra note 1. To some, the battle over the preservation of this
Christian symbol is the “quintessential example” of the Bush administration’s stamp
on the Justice Department in promoting what one group calls the “Faith-based Parks”
initiative. See Press Release, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility,
Justice Department Undercuts Park System for Mojave Cross (Jan. 24, 2008),
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=976 (noting that the Mojave legal
battle has endured for the duration of Bush’s presidency). See generally Public
Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Faith-based Parks: News Releases,
http://www.peer.org/campaigns/earlier/faith-based/news.php (last visited Sept. 28,
2009) (cataloguing the actions taken by the Bush administration).
89. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769.
90. Id.
91. See Lake, supra note 81, at 1B (reporting that the ACLU threatened to sue if
the cross was not removed from Sunrise Rock).
92. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769.
93. Id.
94. Julie Cart, Lawmaker Seeks Land Swap to Let Mojave Cross Stand, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2002, at 6.
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95

an attempt to preserve the cross.
At the same time, the ACLU
initiated a suit on behalf of a former park employee to have the cross
96
removed. In July 2002, the Central District of California ruled in
favor of the ACLU and entered a permanent injunction requiring the
97
removal of the cross.
Before the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in June
98
2004, Congress enacted a third appropriations bill in September
2003 which included terms for a land exchange between the United
States, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Henry and Wanda Sandoz,
99
a couple that had played an active part in preserving the symbol.
This exchange called for the conveyance of a one-acre parcel of the
Mojave National Preserve and for the maintenance of the site as a
100
national memorial. In return, the government received a parcel of
land from the cross’s current curator, Mr. Henry Sandoz.
Additionally, the exchange provided the federal government with
certain reversionary rights conditioned upon a finding by the
Secretary of the Interior that the new landowners were not
101
maintaining the land according to the government’s stipulations.
Despite the circuit court affirming the injunction, the government
102
continued its pursuit of the land exchange.
In 2005, the ACLU

95. See Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 410aaa-56 note (2006)) (establishing the cross as a national memorial);
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-230 (2000) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 461 note (2001)) (restricting the use of
federal funds to remove the cross). Some critics of the transfer claim that
Representative Lewis’s attempts are part of a larger scheme to politicize the National
Park Service. See Michael Janofsky, Critics Say the Park Service Is Letting Religion and
Politics Affect Its Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at N16 (describing recent orders in
Grand Canyon National Park and at the Lincoln Memorial as evidence of
conservative interest groups penetrating the policy of the National Park Service as
part of the Bush administration’s faith-based initiatives).
96. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 770; see Lake, supra note 81, at 1B (recounting the
National Park Service’s employment of Frank Buono from 1994 until his retirement
in 1997).
97. Buono v. Norton (Buono I), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1215–17 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
98. Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 371 F.3d 543, 548–50 (9th Cir. 2004).
99. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,
§ 8121(a)–(f), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note
(2006)) (outlining the transfer of a parcel of land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in
exchange for land previously owned by Mr. and Mrs. Henry Sandoz); Lake,
supra note 81, 1B (recounting Henry Sandoz’s relationship to the cross’s creator and
commitment to maintaining the structure).
100. § 8121(a).
101. § 8121(e).
102. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007),
amended and reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.,
Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).
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103

moved to enforce the injunction. The Central District of California
held that the land transfer appeared to selectively honor only the
fallen soldiers of a particular religion and was “an attempt by the
104
government to evade the permanent injunction.”
When it came
time for the Ninth Circuit to review the district court’s latest
determination in this third installment of litigation, the Seventh
Circuit’s prior decisions provided the blueprint from which the Ninth
105
Circuit would craft its decision.
D. The Circuit Split: Contrasting Applications of the
“Unusual Circumstances” Test
The Seventh Circuit set forth the original test for evaluating the
land transfer remedy in Freedom from Religion Foundation v. City of
106
This test adopts a presumption in favor of the
Marshfield.
107
government’s sale of land to a private entity. In order to rebut this
presumption, the plaintiff must show “unusual circumstances” where
the substance of the transaction still yields government endorsement
108
of religion.
The “circumstances” that may surmount the
government’s presumption of validity include a sale in violation of
109
110
state law, a sale to a straw purchaser, a sale well below fair-market
111
value, a sale of property “inextricably linked with the seat of
112
government,” and the sale of property placed prominently in the
113
public community.
This test favors the transfer while also acknowledging specific
114
factual nuances through a case-by-case analysis. The court justified
the presumption of a transaction’s validity due to the Constitution’s
103. Buono v. Norton (Buono III), 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
104. Id. at 1182.
105. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 778–79 (9th Cir. 2009)
(describing the factual background and rationale of the Seventh Circuit decisions
regarding land transfers and its test that purports to evaluate a transaction based on
its form and substance).
106. 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000).
107. Id. at 491.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 492.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2005).
113. See id. (noting that the monument is not prominently placed within the
context of the park and the sale of land is therefore not a serious constitutional
threat); see also Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487,
494 (7th Cir. 2000) (considering the orientation and location of a statue of Jesus
Christ in evaluating whether the symbol violates the Establishment Clause).
114. See Freedom from Religion Found., 203 F.3d at 491 (requiring courts to “look to
the substance of the transaction as well as its form to determine whether government
action endorsing religion has actually ceased”).
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contrasting treatment of religious speech depending on the identity
115
of the speaker. Because of the danger in potentially limiting private
speech, the Seventh Circuit viewed the land transfer as not only a
116
complete transfer of title, but also a transfer of expression.
In considering the land exchange, the Ninth Circuit employed its
own interpretation of the Seventh Circuit’s test to achieve a very
117
different result.
In its amended opinion, the court agreed in
118
principle with the need for a fact-based inquiry but refused to adopt
119
The Ninth
the Seventh Circuit’s same presumption of validity.
Circuit found continuing state action based on the government’s
ongoing maintenance of the cross after the transfer, the manner of
exchange and bidding, and insistence in preserving the symbol
120
itself. The court reasoned that Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and the Supreme Court’s public function cases require that courts
conduct a purely fact-specific inquiry to guard against continuing
121
government action and state endorsement of religion.
II. A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY FAILS TO ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL
FOR CONTINUING STATE ACTION AND THE EVASION OF A
VALID CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY
In order to counteract the Seventh Circuit’s presumption test,
122
there must be a finding of “unusual circumstances.” However, the
current standard of qualifying “circumstances” fails to address subtle
governmental intrusion like that in Buono. As a result, government
involvement in religious displays slips through the porous cracks in
the Seventh Circuit’s framework.
Without safeguards, the
government’s proposed transfer receives the functional equivalent of
per se approval. The practical result of the government’s use of land
transfers echoes a tradition of attempting to circumvent Supreme

115. See id. (“[T]here is a ‘crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.’” (quoting Bd. of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990))).
116. Id. at 491.
117. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono,
129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).
118. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 759, 779 n.13
(9th Cir. 2009).
119. See id. (advocating for a more searching review of proposed land transfer
remedies in light of the remedy’s potential impact on the Establishment Clause).
120. Id. at 783.
121. Id. at 779 n.13.
122. Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491
(7th Cir. 2000).
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Court precedent using property designations as instruments for
furthering unconstitutional effects.
A. The Weaknesses of the Exceptions in the Seventh Circuit’s
“Unusual Circumstances” Test
The Seventh Circuit’s test requires looking beyond the mere form
of the land transaction and accounting for its true substance in
123
determining whether there is continuing state action. Specifically,
it requires that the terms of transfer meet a particular checklist of
conditions in order to rebut the presumption attached to the
124
transaction.
Concededly, it is possible that procedural steps in approving a
municipality’s land conveyance, as well as the price at which the land
is sold, may weed out egregious examples of continuing state
125
action.
However, mere price-setting and bureaucratic procedures
may, in effect, fail to place all prospective purchasers on equal
126
footing. To illustrate, the Ninth Circuit has previously provided this
example:
Suppose that two similarly situated bidders—Bidder # 1 and Bidder
# 2—each had the minimum acceptable amount of $35,000 to bid
on the project, and Bidder # 1 proposed to retain the cross, while
Bidder # 2 proposed to construct a secular memorial.
The structure of the sale ensured that Bidder # 1 would be awarded
the land. Bidder # 1 could bid the full $35,000 and still
demonstrate the financial capability to maintain a historic war
memorial because the City would subsidize the cost of Bidder # 1’s
proposed memorial by conveying the cross. Bidder # 2 could not
compete successfully with Bidder # 1: If Bidder # 2 matched
Bidder # 1’s bid, then Bidder # 2 could not demonstrate the
financial capability to maintain a historic war memorial, because all
of Bidder # 2’s resources would have been dedicated to the bid
price, and none would have been reserved to fund removal of the
cross and construction of a new memorial. Alternatively, Bidder # 2
could reserve the money needed to remove the cross and construct
123. Id. at 491.
124. See supra notes 106–113 and accompanying text (describing the exceptions to
the Seventh Circuit’s presumption test).
125. See, e.g., Annunziato v. New Haven Bd. of Aldermen, 555 F. Supp. 427, 433
(D. Conn. 1982) (finding the sale of public land to a church was a violation of the
Establishment Clause where the church paid only $1 as consideration and the
transaction amounted to nothing more than a gift).
126. See Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that, independent of procedural regulations in conveying publicly owned land,
the city created an economic incentive to perpetuate a sectarian symbol in violation
of the California Constitution).
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the new memorial. But that option would eliminate Bidder # 2
from the process, because Bidder # 2’s bid in that instance would
127
fall below the minimum acceptable bid.

As demonstrated by the example above, seemingly benign terms
such as the price or method of bidding put in place as part of the
128
conveyance could manipulate the outcome.
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the identity of the purchaser is
similarly inadequate. In that court’s estimation, a “straw purchaser” is
one who allows the government to “continu[e] to exercise duties of
129
ownership” after the conveyance of land. In attaching conditions to
the preservation of a court-decreed unconstitutional religious symbol,
the Veterans of Foreign Wars—the recipient of land under the Buono
130
transfer—essentially becomes an extension of the government.
While title to the parcel indicates private ownership, the true
operator of the site is indistinguishable from pre-transfer conditions.
The mere “form” of a transaction should not blind courts from
potential unconstitutional effects like the advancement of religious
speech.
B. The Land Transfer Employs Property Designations to Create a Perception
of State Endorsement that Evades a Constitutional Guarantee
Aside from its superficial terms, the government’s proposed
transfer has the effect of perpetuating a constitutional wrong through
three principal means. First, the transfer does not remedy the
appearance of continuing government action. Second, the transfer
permits the government to continue its tradition of masking control
over property in order to obviate constitutional rights. Finally,
permitting such transactions to take place could produce the
questionable policy of inviting private individuals and organizations
to carve out pieces of public land for special interests. When
confronted with a remedy that fails to look beyond the face value of

127. Id.
128. Notably, the Mojave transfer did not even go so far as to employ a bidding
process, but rather merely effected an exchange between the original party
responsible for the cross’s construction—the Veterans of Foreign Wars—and the
cross’s current curator. Lake, supra note 81, at 1B.
129. Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492
(7th Cir. 2000).
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000)
(describing the Constitution’s general inapplicability to private conveyances except
for those situations in which servitudes require the performance of “public
functions” or in which the enforcement by a court could constitute government
endorsement of unconstitutional servitudes).
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title ownership, the Supreme Court should strike down any such
backdoor attempts at circumvention.
1.

The land transfer and the perception of continuing state action
Taken together, the terms of the land transfer and the
government’s active role in maintaining the religious symbol even
after the transaction exemplify continuing state action. Title to the
land on which the cross stands does not exonerate the government
actor because the setting of the symbol may still give the impression
131
The Establishment Clause
of being part of government land.
prohibits a perception of government endorsement of religious
132
symbols affixed to state land.
The private beneficiary of the land transfer performs functions
133
normally under the umbrella of the state.
The terms of the
conveyance include a condition that the land, as well as the replica
cross and commemorative plaque purchased with government
134
funds, be maintained as a memorial by the recipient, the Veterans
135
of Foreign Wars. The Mojave cross is a memorial site in the middle
of an area that has been government property for most of the
136
twentieth century.
By exercising control over this land, the
government—not the private party—is the entity to whom the cross’s
137
message is attributed.

131. See Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic
Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 233, 238 (2004) (arguing that proposed land
transfer remedies require greater scrutiny than removal of religious displays due to
the potential for abuse in perpetuating government endorsement).
132. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 868–69 (2005) (remarking that
the reasonable observer would find the counties’ initial postings of the Ten
Commandments replica tablets as emphasizing the text’s religious message).
133. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (“The service rendered even by
a private park of this character is municipal in nature.”).
134. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 410aaa-56 note (2006)).
135. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,
§ 8121(a), (e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note
(2006)).
136. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono,
129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (explaining that the National Park Service received the
Preserve as part of a land transfer in 1994 from the Bureau of Land Management);
see also Brown, supra note 1 (noting that in 1934 the Bureau of Land Management
controlled the land on which the Mojave cross stands).
137. See Pleasant City Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (commenting that, where a government entity purports to maintain a
monument, the entity will be presumed to be engaging in government speech).
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138

Evans v. Newton, a leading Supreme Court case in defining
“public function,” helps illustrate the impact of continuing municipal
139
maintenance after a transfer in title. Evans involved the transfer of
a tract of land from a United States Senator to the city of Macon,
140
Georgia.
As a condition of the transfer, the parcel was to be
141
controlled by the city and used as a park “for white people only.”
Facing opposition from members of the community, the city removed
itself as trustee of the property but continued its routine maintenance
142
of the property just as it had when it was under public control.
The Court held that the existence of a segregated park that benefited
from city involvement was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the mere transfer of title from public to private
hands did not instantly erase an established tradition of government
143
involvement in the property.
Like the city of Macon in Evans, the federal government has played
a key part in maintaining the Mojave Preserve for all visitors to
144
enjoy.
In Evans, the city manicured and cleaned the segregated
145
Similarly, the
park both before and after its time as trustee.
government used funds to purchase a sign and replica cross and
stipulated the methods of the Mojave Cross’s continued
146
preservation.
Specifically, the proposed transfer provides that the
Secretary of the Interior continue oversight regarding land use
147
through the use of reversionary rights. Just as the segregated park

138. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
139. See id. at 301 (holding that, where the municipality has maintained a city
park, the city park remains intertwined in its control and is therefore still subject to
the Fourteenth Amendment).
140. Id. at 297.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 297–98, 301.
143. Id. at 301.
144. See id. (stating that a park is more like a police department than a social club
in that it traditionally serves an entire community).
145. See id. (recounting that there has been “no change in municipal maintenance
and concern” over the park since the exchange of trustees took place).
146. See Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 410aaa-56 note (2006)) (“The Secretary of the Interior shall use not more
than $10,000 of funds . . . to acquire a replica of the original memorial plaque and
cross . . . .”).
147. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,
§ 8121(e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note
(2006)) (“The conveyance . . . shall be subject to the condition that the recipient
maintain the conveyed property as a memorial . . . . If the Secretary determines that
the conveyed property is no longer being maintained as a war memorial, the
property shall revert to the ownership of the United States.”); see also Hampton v.
City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 322–23 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding “complete present
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149

in Evans did not shed its unconstitutional character through transfer,
the mere substitution of ownership from public to private parties
does not automatically free the land on which the cross stands of its
148
public nature.
Of course, the Court has not categorically stated that a private
party maintaining land in a public park always constitutes a quasi149
public actor.
The Court has, in fact, narrowed the definition of
150
Because the Buono
public function in state parks significantly.
transfer contains reversionary language comparable to those cases in
which there is no change in government involvement following the
transfer of ownership, it falls within the scope of imputing “public
151
function” to private parties in the context of public parks.
Aside from oversight through maintenance over supposedly
conveyed land, “public function” may also exist due to a lack of
152
physical separation between public and private property.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City
153
Corp. provides an example of effective separation of the public and
private arenas.

control” by a municipality where a reversionary clause was included in deeds to
segregated golf clubs).
148. See Pleasant City Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009) (remarking
that public parks are often closely associated with the government unit that owns the
land); Evans, 382 U.S. at 302 (holding that, regardless of title, the “public character”
of a park prohibits racial segregation under the Fourteenth Amendment);
see also United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d 425, 430–32 (5th Cir. 1974) (invalidating
a lease of an educational facility from a municipal body to a private segregated
school on the basis that government aid may not be used to further racially
discriminatory measures such as the provision of a non-unitary school); Hampton, 304
F.2d at 323 (finding that there is continuing state action when a city sells golf courses
to private parties with reversionary provisions requiring that the private owner
continue operating the facility with the same racially discriminatory conditions as
previously required under government ownership).
149. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978) (doubting
whether Evans was intended to extend to all situations where private parties operate
parks for recreational purposes).
150. See id. (advocating for the position that Evans applies where there is no
change in government involvement in the land after the transfer).
151. See Hampton, 304 F.2d at 320–21 (rejecting terms of a transfer permitting
reversion of a segregated golf course to the government “if said property be not so
maintained [as a golf course] or . . . converted to other use, said property will
immediately revert to the [government], its successor or assigns, and it shall be lawful
for the [government], its successors or assigns to re-enter and repossess said property
and thereafter to peaceably hold and enjoy the same as if this conveyance had not
been made”).
152. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1946) (commenting that, in a
town owned by a private corporation, an area designated as a “business block” is
indistinguishable from other sections because it is openly accessible to all who
choose to pass through).
153. 425 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Utah Gospel Mission involved a controversy over a city’s sale of a
154
portion of a street to the Church of Latter-Day Saints. As part of an
easement, the city reserved rights to public access, but also provided
155
that the church could restrict expression on the parcel.
After a
156
legal challenge prohibiting the repression of speech on the street,
157
When challenged again
the city sold the easement to the church.
on the grounds that the church-owned street and plaza constituted a
public forum and could not, therefore, have speech restrictions,
the Tenth Circuit held that the church could restrict speech and was
158
not a state actor.
Notably, the court reasoned that the church’s
clear delineation of its parcel from surrounding public streets and
sidewalks distinguished the case from past situations where the public
159
function principle had previously applied. The court also reasoned
that because the city was not responsible for maintenance or other
control of the street, the church’s sole ownership precluded any
160
claim of public function.
The parcel at issue in Buono is neither clearly delineated from
other public spaces, nor solely under the control of the private
161
party.
While the “objective attributes” of the area covered under
the easement in Utah Gospel Mission were distinguishable from the city
162
streets surrounding it, the cross in question stands in the middle of
163
the Mojave desert, without separation from the land around it.
Without physical separation of public and private land, there is a
164
Here, continuing
greater potential for government endorsement.

154. Id. at 1252.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1253. See generally First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
308 F.3d 1114, 1131 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that speech could face content-based
restrictions on the Plaza, which was found to constitute a public forum).
157. Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1253.
158. Id. at 1255.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,
§ 8121(a)–(e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note
(2006)) (establishing the government’s control over property).
162. See Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1252–53 (noting the Plaza’s unique
walking surface and elaborate structures around its points of entry).
163. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2007),
amended and reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.,
Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (describing the location and setting of the
cross and noting the lack of a sign).
164. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 776 (1995)
(advocating the posting of a sign disclaiming government sponsorship of a cross
erected by the Ku Klux Klan because of the fear that the symbol’s proximity to
government property could suggest government approval of a religious message);
Budd, supra note 131, at 240 (noting the importance of visible demarcation by
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government action exists due to the existence of reversionary
language in the terms of transfer and the failure to separate the
transferred land through physical delineation of the parcel.
2.

The masking of government actors using property concepts
When remedying a violation of a constitutional right, the net effect
165
cannot circumvent the protection afforded by the courts. Though
the form of the proposed transaction in Buono removes the
government from legal ownership, government action persists in
substance, as does the expression of a patently religious symbol on
166
what is perceived to be public land. At its core, the Buono transfer
represents the potential for evasion of an adequate constitutional
167
Courts should take note of these unanticipated
remedy.
unconstitutional effects when the government manipulates property
as part of a proposed remedy.
Faulty desegregation plans, the silver platter doctrine, and the
Mojave land transfer demonstrate similar blending of property and
government control. Through each process, the government, by
168
exerting a measure of control over a supposedly independent party,
169
has permitted the use of property for an unconstitutional purpose.
In Griffin, county officials closed public property and replaced it with
stating that “[i]t does little good to sell property underlying a religious symbol if the
change in ownership is apparent only to those who conduct a title search”).
165. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 n.7 (1960) (noting the “basic
incongruity in a rule which excludes evidence unlawfully obtained by federal officers,
but admits in the same court evidence unlawfully obtained by state agents”
(citing People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (N.Y. 1926))).
166. See supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the weaknesses in looking solely at the
superficial terms of the transaction without investigating the potential for continuing
government action).
167. See Budd, supra note 131, at 237 (describing the various doctrinal situations in
which courts scrutinize land transfers for potential constitutional violations);
cf. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964) (stating that the object of
state action in closing the public school system must be constitutional, and
opposition to desegregation does not qualify as such); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 215 (1960) (commenting that it would be “curiously ambivalent” to
differentiate between unconstitutionally seized evidence when brought by federal
agents as compared to state agents in contravention of Fourth Amendment
protections).
168. See Griffin, 377 U.S. at 222–24 (cataloguing Prince Edward County’s efforts in
funding segregated private schools by providing, inter alia, busing and tuition grants
to students); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221–22 (acknowledging that the silver platter
doctrine invites federal officials to “tacitly . . . encourage state officers in the
disregard of constitutionally protected freedom”).
169. See Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231 (determining that Prince Edward County’s funding
and operation of segregated private schools was administered for the sole purpose of
“ensur[ing] . . . that white and colored children . . . would not, under any
circumstances, go to the same school”); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 209–10 (noting the rise of
the silver platter doctrine and the past use of property seized by state officials in
federal prosecutions).
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170

government-subsidized segregated schools.
In the context of the
silver platter doctrine, state actors deprived individuals of private
property and used this illegally-obtained evidence to assist federal
171
prosecutors build their cases in federal court.
While the two
contexts address different types of property, in substance they
resemble situations in which a government body manipulated parties
not constrained by the same constitutional limitations to hide its
172
continued, unlawful involvement. Courts should take note of each
of these historical constitutional struggles because the manipulation
of public and private property presents itself again as part of the
Mojave land transfer.
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection
contexts each demonstrate the Court’s focus on the overall effects of
the government’s proposed remedies rather than mere form or
process. Following Brown, the Court has often used firm language in
173
requiring the immediate institution of unitary school systems, and
made strong efforts to weed out those parties whose programs failed
174
Similarly, in Griffin, the Court looked
constitutional muster.
beyond the county’s plan to give aid to private schools and resolved
that the program had the unconstitutional effect of depriving free
175
public education for invidious purposes.
170. See supra notes 46–56 and accompanying text (tracking the significance of
Griffin in the context of faulty desegregation plans).
171. See supra notes 57–79 and accompanying text (discussing the rise and fall of
the doctrine and the role of Elkins in providing a declaration that illegally seized
property could not be used as an instrument of the prosecution). Admittedly, the
silver platter doctrine may be distinguished from the present situation because it
involves the federal government's manipulation of another government body, rather
than a private citizen. However, the identity of the manipulated party makes little
difference. Constitutional requirements allowed the use of property seized by state
officials in federal court because state officials were not bound by the same legal
limitations as their federal counterparts. Thus, even though each party in this
context may be classified as a government actor, the Constitution imposed on them
crucially different limitations. This differential treatment permitted the federal
government's circumvention of the exclusionary rule. See supra notes 62–64 and
accompanying text (outlining the exception to Weeks’s exclusionary rule).
172. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the government’s continuing presence on
the conveyed property); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1254 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining private property as property “over which the owner has exclusive and
absolute rights”) (emphasis added).
173. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968) (“The transition
to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be
brought about . . . .”).
174. See KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 102–03 (recounting that in 1968 the Court
removed the power of evaluating desegregation plans from the parties themselves
and directed courts to gauge compliance based on the actual quantity of black
children attending previously segregated schools).
175. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1964) (declaring that
the school board’s plan to close public schools and provide aid for private schools
was enacted for the sole purpose of perpetuating racial segregation).
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The lineage of cases tracking the demise of the silver platter
doctrine similarly exemplifies the Court’s close focus on assuring that
176
the purpose of a remedy continues to be served. The silver platter
doctrine had the effect of permitting the use of illegally seized
property in federal court that would not be admissible evidence had
177
federal agents performed the original seizure.
Thus, regardless of
the true identity of the violator, a remedy for a constitutional
violation like that in Buono must erase the infringement on the
178
complainant’s rights not just partially but completely. Because the
injured party retains the impression that there is government
endorsement of religion, the mere change in title ownership does
nothing to fully and effectively correct the government’s
179
constitutional wrong.
The substitution of actors in the Buono transfer is similar to that in
the silver platter doctrine because in practice each allows prohibited
government action to persist as long as it is masked by different
180
actors.
This trend of cloaking a constitutional violation in a
181
“private” identity continues in Griffin’s desegregation context.
Like a cross on a small parcel of land that appears to be governmentowned, the effect of the county’s action was a segregated public
182
school system.
By examining potential unconstitutional effects,
courts should take notice that the freedom from government
endorsement of religion cannot be so easily avoided through the
mere manipulation of property ownership.

176. See supra notes 57–79 and accompanying text (tracking the history of the
constitutional loophole in the Court’s original distinction between federal and state
officials and the succeeding cases that worked to assure the exclusionary rule applied
to unreasonable searches by any government official).
177. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960) (acknowledging the
unintended result of the silver platter doctrine while recognizing that “[t]o the
victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal
agent or by a state officer” (citation omitted)).
178. See Budd, supra note 131, at 215 (citing Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism
and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 914 (1999)) (warning that
remedies falling short of completely curing a constitutional injury may aggravate
harm by rendering the original court ruling more of a request than an order).
179. See Budd, supra note 131 at 237–38 (noting the connection between
perceived religious endorsement and state action as part of a land sale).
180. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1927) (“[T]he court must be
vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect and a hand to prevent
violations of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect methods.”).
181. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964) (finding that
desegregation in publicly funded private schools in a county where the public school
system had been closed resulted in the functional equivalent of a public segregated
school system).
182. Id. at 232.
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3.

Carving up the commons: The slippery slope on Sunrise Rock
Additionally, the government action in Buono provides an implicit
invitation to engage in similar conduct that could have unfortunate
policy implications. Any entity desirous of erecting a permanent
religious symbol on public land would have what amounts to a
183
court-established right to a piece of the commons.
Governments
would then need to determine the size of each particular group’s plot
and also become involved in the inevitable disputes over the relative
184
sizes of each group’s piece of public land.
Also, even if the
government were to appease a broad range of groups through
various land sales, it could run afoul of establishing a preference for
185
believers over non-believers.
These potential scenarios directly contradict the Supreme Court’s
recent express disapproval of using public parks as a mosaic of
expression through symbols and monuments. In Pleasant Grove City v.
186
Summum, the Court looked to the potential for abuse in refusing to
187
allow a religious group to erect a monument in a public park.
Officials of Pleasant Grove City, Utah rejected a religious
organization’s request to build a monument containing the Seven
188
Aphorisms of Summum.
Though the park in question featured
eleven other displays, including a Ten Commandments monument,
the City denied the organization’s request because the proposed
construction was neither privately donated nor did it reflect part of

183. See Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1013 (W.D. Wis. 2004),
rev’d, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the sale of public land exacerbates an
Establishment Clause violation through communicating to non-believers that a
municipality is willing to erect a religious display and alter the composition of a
public park to insure that the symbol does not have to share its space with other
expressive displays).
184. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 792 (1995)
(Souter, J., concurring) (“By allowing [the] government to encourage what it cannot
do on its own, the proposed per se rule [that no government endorsement arises from
private religious expression] would tempt a public body to contract out its
establishment of religion . . . to exhibit what the government could not display
itself.”).
185. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (observing the First
Amendment’s historical need for “neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion” (emphasis added) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947))).
186. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
187. See id. at 1138 (presenting the potential choice of a viewpoint-neutral
government entity between a multitude of statues and displays in a public park, or
the forced removal of each existing expressive monument).
188. Id. at 1127. For more information on the Summum tradition and the
meaning of the Seven Aphorisms, see generally Summum—Sealed Except to the
Open Mind, http://www.summum.us (last visited Sept. 28, 2009) (discussing the
underlying philosophy of Summum and the Seven Summum Aphormisms).
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189

the municipality’s history.
In ruling for the City, the Court
distinguished between the expression of speakers and monuments in
a public park by emphasizing the enduring nature of the latter’s
190
message.
The Court found it “hard to imagine” a system that
permitted the installation of any symbol desirous of its slice of the
191
A framework that permits a multitude of monuments
public pie.
through the piecemeal distribution of the commons would also
192
undoubtedly raise the Court’s suspicions.
Finally, should the government be fortunate enough to avoid issues
of religious preference and neutrality altogether, the practical result
could yield unintended consequences. For example, a petition
calling for a transfer of land to permit the placement of a wooden
193
swastika on public land would surely elicit a very different reaction
than the cross in Buono. These hypothetical situations illustrate that
carving out public lands into private parcels to appease particular
religious groups—while at the same time conflicting with Supreme
Court doctrine—could invite religious tension rather than alleviate
194
it.
III. REPLACING THE LAND TRANSFER PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY WITH
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit’s
present presumptive test does not appropriately take into account the
potential perception of government endorsement where land on
195
which a recognized violation occurs is sold to a private party.
In order to assure that the government fully complies with an
injunction prohibiting the establishment of religion, courts should
adopt a test that examines not only the form of such transactions

189. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30.
190. See id. at 1137 (stating that monuments permanently monopolize public land,
while speakers eventually tire and depart the space, taking their message with them).
191. Id.
192. See id. (stipulating that public parks were only meant to accommodate a
limited selection of permanent displays).
193. See Hemant G. Padhya, Information and Origin of Hindu Swastika, Mar. 15,
2005, http://www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_050314.htm (describing the swastika as a
symbol of the “endless nature of God” representing truth, compassion, tolerance and
happiness in the ancient Vedic Dharma and Hindu Dharma traditions).
194. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612–13 (1989)
(invalidating the display of a crèche on public grounds based on the Constitution’s
required “respect for religious diversity” in permitting public displays).
195. See supra Part II.A (discussing the shortcomings of the Seventh Circuit’s
presumption).
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(as originally expressed in Freedom from Religion Foundation), but also
196
the potential for an unconstitutional effect.
A. The Use of Lemon and a Response to Its Critics
In order to evaluate whether the transfer has a constitutional
purpose and effect, courts should return to one of its original sources
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Though Lemon has its critics
197
on and off the Court, this multi-pronged approach could more
adequately address constitutional concerns by looking not only at the
purpose of the government’s proposed remedy but also at the
198
constitutional effect of such action.
By asking whether a land
transaction satisfies a valid secular purpose, courts could effectively
ferret out transactions that blatantly fail to accomplish a secular
199
purpose.
Furthermore, by analyzing the potential effect of the
transaction, courts could more adequately address concerns
regarding an unconstitutional perception of government
200
endorsement.

196. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491
(7th Cir. 2000) (“[A]dherence to a formalistic standard invites manipulation.”);
see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 48 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(commenting that, for judges and prosecutors desirous of admitting illegally
obtained evidence into court, “[c]ompliance with the Bill of Rights betokens more
than lip service”). Granted, Freedom from Religion Foundation does include language
that expresses the need to look to the “substance” of a transaction as well as its form.
203 F.3d at 491. However, the test’s presumption in favor of the government
hamstrings any effect of such language on the practical application of the test.
See supra Part II.A (describing the superficial nature on which the land transaction is
evaluated under the Seventh Circuit’s test).
197. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 890 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court had
previously expressed dissatisfaction with the principle of neutrality that the Lemon
test embodies); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (finding the three prongs
of Lemon to be “no more than helpful signposts”). See generally infra notes 201–203
and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 17–37 and accompanying text (following Lemon’s focus as it
has evolved since its original use); supra notes 204–206 and accompanying text
(same).
199. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (holding that a Kentucky
law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms was for the
unconstitutional purpose of imposing religious doctrine on students); Staley v.
Harris County, 461 F.3d 504, 514–15 (2006) (finding that a county had a
predominantly religious purpose for erecting a monument of an open bible
memorializing a prominent philanthropist in front of a Texas Courthouse).
200. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Establishment Clause forbids a State to hide
behind the application of formally neutral criteria and remain studiously oblivious to
the effects of its actions.”). See generally Budd, supra note 131, at 215–20 (discussing
various approaches to the remedial inquiry with respect to Establishment Clause
violations).
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Opponents of Lemon will undoubtedly be quick to point out its
faults. For example, critics contend that judges can manipulate the
201
test’s malleable terms to their individual points of view, while others
believe Lemon fails to address all the complexities of our
202
Constitution’s treatment of religion. Still others claim it misses the
meaning of the anti-establishment guarantee by being too focused on
203
government neutrality.
While there may be some merit to these claims, the Court’s
inconsistent criticisms of the test have themselves produced a
204
haphazard application. For all the controversy surrounding its use,
Lemon has not been expressly overruled and remains a common

201. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 14, at 156 (stating that the Lemon test of “excessive
entanglement” is a completely relative term that has no readily distinguishable
meaning).
202. See, e.g., Ronald Thiemann, The Constitutional Tradition: A Perplexing Legacy, in
LAW & RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 345, 357–59 (Stephen M. Feldman ed.,
2000) (noting that, like other tests, the Lemon test errantly considers the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause to be separate doctrines rather
than intermingled legal principles); William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with
Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 194 (2000) (describing religion clause
jurisprudence as so muddled that “[e]very new case accepted for argument presents
the very real possibility that the Court might totally abandon its previous efforts and
start over”).
203. PETER K. ROFES, THE RELIGION GUARANTEES 41 (2005) (describing Justice
Rehnquist’s perspective that the Lemon test should permit the government’s use of
religious institutions to achieve secular means rather than maintaining a strict
withdrawal from all religious activity).
204. Compare McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 861–62 (2005) (focusing
on the “purpose” inquiry of the Lemon test as applied to the religious symbol’s
context), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–87 (2005) (denying the Lemon
test any constitutional significance when dealing with ambiguously identified
“passive” monuments like that in question and instead evaluating the symbol under a
history and tradition analysis). For a colorful commentary on Lemon’s continued
existence, one need look no further than the exchange between Justice White and
Justice Scalia in a 1993 case in which Scalia compared the test to a creature in a
horror movie:
The secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is
there to scare us . . . when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to
return to the tomb at will . . . . When we wish to strike down a practice it
forbids, we invoke it . . . ; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids,
we ignore it entirely. . . . Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping
around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need
him.
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice White acted as an advocate for
this supposed “monster” in the majority opinion:
While we are somewhat diverted by Justice Scalia’s evening at the cinema,
we return to the reality that . . . Lemon, however frightening it might be to
some, has not been overruled. This case, like Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, presents no occasion to do so.
Id. at 395 n.7 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
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205

starting point for analysis.
Moreover, the Court’s application of
Lemon in recent decisions indicates that the test is not merely waiting
to be overruled, but rather is an active member of Establishment
206
Clause doctrine.
The use of Lemon in this scenario also provides the additional
benefit of uniformity. Subjecting the proposed land transfer to one
test would provide lower courts with a framework connecting the
207
analysis of the remedy to the infraction it claims to correct.
This uniformity in analysis would be a rarity in Establishment Clause
208
jurisprudence, particularly with regard to religious symbols.
B. Applying Lemon to the Mojave Cross
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that a government
209
enactment have a valid secular purpose.
Second, Lemon requires
210
that the relevant state action neither advance nor inhibit religion.
Finally, the proposed government action may not foster “excessive
211
entanglement” with religion.
In more recent applications of the
212
Lemon test, the Court has blended the final two prongs together.
Regardless of the grouping of its prongs, it is clear that the Lemon test
targets the two necessary inquiries in light of our discussion of the
205. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668–69 (2002) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (claiming that the Lemon test is a “central tool” in the Establishment
Clause analysis relating to school vouchers); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 n.3
(1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (declaring that Lemon has been used in many of the
Court’s Establishment Clause cases and that stare decisis requires the continuance of
this tradition); see also Jessica Gavrich, Comment, Constitutional Law: Judicial
Oversights—Inconsistency in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 58 FLA. L. REV. 437, 444–45
(noting that, because Van Orden merely avoided discussion of Lemon while McCreary
County reasserted its importance, lower courts are left with confusion, but not express
renunciation of the test).
206. See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 864–65 (finding that the two Kentucky
counties’ displays of the Ten Commandments in courthouses violated Lemon because
the displays did not have a secular purpose).
207. See DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 131, 678–79
(3d ed. 2002) (stating that injunctive relief must safeguard legal rights without
overprotecting).
208. See Budd, supra note 131, at 215–16 (noting the inconsistent methodology in
structuring the question of remedies for religious symbols).
209. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997) (explaining the
overlap of the Lemon prongs in the context of government aid to religious groups or
programs by stating that the factors used in assessing “entanglement” are similar to
those used in determining an unconstitutional “effect”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (interpreting the “effects” and
“entanglement” prongs of Lemon as safeguards against “government practice[s]
[having] the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or
disapproval of religion . . . whether intentionally or unintentionally”); ROFES,
supra note 203, at 30 (tracking the evolution of the Lemon test).
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Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments: (1) the purpose of the
proposed government action and (2) the effect of the transaction
regarding both real and perceived government control of a religious
213
symbol. As illustrated by the analysis of school desegregation plans
and the silver platter doctrine, the use of property designations has
214
led the Court to examine these same core concerns. Having noted
the congruence of Lemon with the need for a secular purpose and net
constitutional effect, we may apply the test to the Mojave land
transfer.
215
On its face, the transfer appears to have a secular purpose.
Concededly, the terms of the transfer make no express mention of
216
However, under Lemon the
Christianity or religion in general.
“secular purpose” prong is evaluated by “one presumed to be familiar
with the history of the government’s actions and competent to learn
217
what history has to show.”
In Buono, court rulings prior to the
218
transfer held the cross to be a violation of the Establishment Clause,
and government legislation to preserve the cross took place only after
the National Park Service announced its intention to remove the

213. The inquiry into perceived endorsement in the context of religious symbols
has previously garnered criticism. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (refusing to use the Establishment Clause as a “modified
heckler’s veto” in which one individual’s misperception defeats a group’s ability to
engage in religious practice). In Good News Club, the school dissociated itself from a
religious group by requiring that meetings take place after school hours and be open
to all members of the public. Id. at 113–14. However, the land sale context is
distinguishable from endorsement in Good News Club and similar cases because the
land transfer context involves legislative action with continuing government
oversight over land that it has supposedly completely renounced. See supra Part II.B.1
(explaining that even in a land transfer the monuments on the land will still be
linked to government action).
214. See supra Part II.B (describing three ways the government’s proposed land
transfer will offend the principles of the Constitution).
215. Cf. Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 346–47
(Or. 1976) (finding that a large concrete cross in a public park passed constitutional
muster on the grounds that it was intended to be a memorial to war veterans).
216. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,
§ 8121(a)–(e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note
(2006)) (providing background on the terms of the transfer).
217. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005); see also Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (characterizing the reasonable observer as one who is aware of the
context in which the religious display exists).
218. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1073–75 (9th Cir. 2007),
amended and reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar
v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (noting that the plaintiff, Frank Buono, filed suit in
March of 2001 and the Central District of California entered an injunction enjoining
the display of the cross in July 2002, while the land transfer agreement passed
through Congress in September 2003 after the parties had been heard on appeal in
the Ninth Circuit as part of Buono II).
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219

symbol. Meanwhile, federal courts were in the process of hearing—
220
Moreover, the
and ultimately upholding—the original injunction.
express terms of the original agreement providing for continued
government oversight and a reversionary interest indicating that the
government did not intend to relinquish its interest to a private party
221
but rather to ensure the preservation of the cross itself.
A reasonable observer could potentially view repeated attempts at
shielding the Mojave cross from forced removal through litigation
222
and legislation as the preservation of a patently religious message.
Even if one were to assume the government’s purpose in enacting
the legislation was wholly secular, the land transfer has the effect of
endorsing a patently religious symbol due to continuing government
223
action and the perception of public ownership.
The cross stands
224
surrounded by public property with no means of separation.
Therefore, by mere observation the transfer fails to address the
225
perception that the land remains under federal control.
Such a

219. See Savage, supra note 8, at A8 (explaining the ongoing dispute over the cross
and how this issue may give the Supreme Court an opportunity to reformulate the
law on church-state separation); see also Cart, supra note 94, at B6 (discussing the
controversy over the cross in the Mojave National Preserve).
220. See supra Part II.C.2 (outlining the history of the litigation and the
government’s legislative responses).
221. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 782 (9th Cir. 2009)
(recounting the government’s various “herculean efforts” to preserve the cross);
see also Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 410aaa-56 note (2006)) (“The five-foot-tall white cross . . . is hereby designated as a
national memorial commemorating United States participation in World War I and
honoring the American veterans of that war.”); § 8137(c) (“The Secretary . . . shall
use not more than $10,000 of funds . . . to acquire a replica of the original memorial
plaque and cross . . . .”); § 8121(a) (providing for the land exchange while
reinforcing the Secretary’s responsibilities under § 8137).
222. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 872–73 (holding that the inclusion of
nonreligious texts in a display featuring the Ten Commandments did not nullify the
County’s plainly religious purpose in violation of Lemon); supra note 217 and
accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp.
886, 891–92 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that, although the city claimed it was
constructed for the purpose of promoting tourism, an illuminated cross in a public
park must be removed because it impermissibly promoted religion and the
government’s maintenance of the structure produced excessive entanglement).
224. See Buono v. Norton (Buono I), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205–07 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (noting that the cross is not surrounded by any enclosures or signs indicating
that the cross is used for religious purposes or as a memorial to war veterans, but
instead the symbol sits on a “natural desert environment”).
225. See supra notes 134–148 and accompanying text (describing the government’s
continued involvement in the ownership and care of the cross).
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policy that entrenches a government entity in the advancement of
226
religion is impermissible.
CONCLUSION
Legal doctrine concerning the display of religious symbols on
public land has provided various tests to interpret state action and
evaluate potential violations. However, the question currently at issue
is not whether the government has established religion in the past,
but what it may do to remedy a religious display on public land that
violates the Establishment Clause.
The Mojave land transfer
illustrates one innovative response: a transaction transferring title
ownership of land containing a religious symbol from public to
private hands. Shrouded in plywood, the desert cross awaits the
Supreme Court’s release from juridical purgatory.
The Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection contexts reflect the
need for courts to look beyond formalistic ownership-based
categories to determine whether the proposed remedy produces
unlawful continuing state action. Using these doctrines as guides,
it is apparent that the Seventh Circuit’s presumption of validity test
fails to adequately address both the purpose and the overall effect of
such land transfers with regard to Establishment Clause
considerations. Courts can remedy this incongruity by employing the
test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman. This test would work to safeguard
against both an outwardly religious purpose on the part of legislators,
and the practical effect of circumventing a constitutional right
through manipulation of formal property categories.
More than two hundred years after Thomas Jefferson penned his
227
famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association,
Buono v.
Kempthorne provides the Supreme Court a chance to give Thomas
Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor new meaning.
The proposed property transfer brings to light both the symbolic and
literal implications of this oft-cited analogy. A failure to view the
proposed remedy in its broader context could provide future
violators with a blueprint for eluding this historic boundary.

226. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315–16 (2000) (finding
that a school policy calling for an elected student to deliver an “invocation” at the
school’s football games was an act of impermissible government supervision over
religious debate).
227. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1,
1802) (on file with the Thomas Jefferson Papers at the Library of Congress), available
at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/danburys.jpg.

